John D.
Hader‡
*a,
Marcus
Frenzel§
b,
Jerome
Scullin¶
c,
Elzbieta
Plaza
c and
Matthew
MacLeod
*a
aDepartment of Environmental Science, Stockholm University, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden. E-mail: john.hader@aces.su.se; matthew.macleod@aces.su.se
bKäppalaförbundet, Södra Kungsvägen 315, 181 63 Lidingö, Sweden
cDepartment of Sustainable Development, Environmental Science and Engineering, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 10044 Stockholm, Sweden
First published on 8th August 2023
Down-the-drain chemical spills that reach a sewage treatment plant (STP) can cause a biological “toxic shock” that may reduce or eliminate the capability of STP microorganisms to remove organic matter and nutrients for weeks to months. Thus, chemical spills are a threat to water quality. Here, we present a case study of toxic shock threat prioritization for chemicals used at industrial facilities connected to the Käppala STP in Stockholm, Sweden. We surveyed 60 facilities, collected information on the use and storage of bulk chemical products, and documented 8676 uses of constituent chemicals. In situ chemical tracer experiments were conducted in the primary sewer tunnel leading to Käppala to measure chemical spill dilution during transit to the plant. To assess chemical risks to the plant, we extracted data on toxicity to STP microorganisms for 6168 chemicals from European Chemicals Agency brief profiles and estimated exposure concentrations in the plant using conservative assumptions. Under a high-end spill scenario, the majority of chemicals in the survey posed a negligible risk for adverse effects on plant microorganisms, however 28 chemicals were identified as posing a potential risk and were prioritized for additional information gathering to refine our conservative assumptions. The analysis framework was built into an online tool (RAVEN STREAM) provided as free, open-source software for STP operators to screen for threats posed by possible chemical spills at connected facilities. The threat identification framework can facilitate communication between STPs and their upstream industrial clients to mitigate possible high-risk chemical spills before they happen.
Environmental significanceDown-the-drain chemical spills at industrial facilities can contaminate a receiving sewage treatment plant and damage the microbial community's ability to remove environmentally harmful material from wastewater. To help identify and prevent such chemical spills from happening, we developed an open-access online tool that helps identify chemicals used upstream that could harm a treatment plant if spilled down the drain, and informs the need for supplementary spill mitigation measures. The output of the chemical spill threat identification framework facilitates improved management of industrial chemical storage, reduces risk to the proper operation of the receiving sewage treatment plant, and thus helps mitigate environmental pollution. |
The capacity of STP microorganisms for nutrient removal can be degraded or even destroyed during so called “toxic shock” events, in which a large-volume chemical spill reaches the plant in influent water. One example of such an event was the release of a chemical used in adhesives upstream of the Syvab STP near Stockholm, Sweden in the fall of 2013.3,4 The toxic shock event caused by that chemical spill resulted in complete termination of the nitrification ability of microorganisms in the activated sludge, and a roughly 5-fold increase in the outgoing ammonium levels from the plant. Proper nitrogen removal capacity was not fully restored for over 6 months after the event. In another case, Topalova et al., 2018 (ref. 5) documented the impacts of an upstream spill of mazut that impacted functioning of activated sludge at an STP in Sofia, Bulgaria for a period of over 3 weeks. Another incident was recorded in the city of Borås, Sweden, where a spill of roughly 17 m3 of diesel oil at a hospital contaminated the municipal STP and disrupted the nitrogen processes of the biological stage, causing ammonium levels to be above acceptable levels for roughly one month.6
STP operators can work to avoid toxic shock events caused by chemical spills through communication and cooperation with their upstream clients. Ettala and Rossi, 1994,7 for example, conducted on-site surveys of 11 industrial facilities across two STP service areas. Based on chemicals stored on-site, chemical inhibition concentrations, and STP operational details, they calculated threshold amounts of chemicals that would have to be spilled to impair methanogenesis, carbonaceous material removal, and nitrification capabilities of the plant, as well as the possibilities for sludge contamination or exceedance of the plant's aeration capacity.7
A number of modelling frameworks have been developed for planning responses to contamination of wastewater, such as the modelling framework by Amstutz et al., 2008 (ref. 8) and the US EPA's Wastewater Response Protocol Toolbox (WRPT).9 One of the recommended risk assessment tools in the WRPT is the Water Contaminant Information Tool (WCIT), which is a secure tool that can be used to assess risk to water from contamination by accidental spills or terrorist activity.10 The WCIT contains information on more than 800 drinking water and wastewater contaminants, including industrial chemicals and pathogens. The source code for the WCIT is, however, not publicly available, and use of the tool is limited to US-based drinking water and wastewater facilities, state and federal officials, and EPA partners.10 Furthermore, risk for disruption to the proper operation of STPs are not calculated by this tool, but rather only estimates for how a chemical may physically contaminate STP infrastructure. The integrated modelling framework by Amstutz et al.8 combines simulations of contaminant transport through source water, drinking water, and wastewater to plan for and respond to the impacts and risks from deliberate or accidental toxic chemical contamination events. This modelling framework, however, utilises computationally-intensive hydraulic simulations in a geospatially-explicit representation of the urban water infrastructure domain, making it poorly suited for rapid analysis of risks posed by a large number of industrial chemicals used upstream from an STP. Thus, there is currently a lack of an open source, high-throughput, upstream chemical risk assessment tool that can be used by STPs to rapidly screen for and prioritize threats from spills of a large number of industrial chemicals that may be used upstream.
Here, we present a novel upstream chemical threat prioritization framework, and demonstrate its use with a case study conducted at Sweden's third largest STP which is operated by Käppalaförbundet (i.e., “The Käppala Association”, hereafter referred to as “Käppala”). The framework addresses a key question of upstream chemical management: which industrial chemicals at which upstream facilities could result in adverse impacts on the STP if they are spilled? In our case study, we combined a survey of industrial chemical products used by upstream clients, data on chemical toxicity towards activated sludge microorganisms, in situ measurements of simulated chemical spills in the STP tunnel system, and modelling of hypothetical high-end chemical spill scenarios to produce a screening assessment of threats to the Käppala STP from possible upstream chemical spills.
The output of the threat prioritization framework is a ranked list of industrial chemical products and the constituent chemicals used upstream that, if spilled, pose the highest risk to the proper functioning of the receiving STP. The chemical risk values generated by our approach are not ‘true’ risks posed to an STP, because a number of factors that are not considered at the industrial facilities, in the sewer tunnel system, and in the plant may affect the actual risk. Rather, the outcome is a prioritization list that can facilitate communication between STPs and their upstream clients by identifying potential threats to the plant and providing a list of chemicals for which additional information gathering is needed regarding the likelihood and potential severity of a down-the-drain spill (e.g., storage locations, refined inventory information, existing safety protocols, etc.). Such information gathering may elucidate the need for additional mitigation measures to reduce the likelihood of down-the-drain spills of chemicals that pose a high potential risk. The chemical datasets and risk modelling framework behind our threat identification methodology are provided as freely available, open-source, online software: The Rapid Assessment of Vulnerability from Emissions Upstream (RAVEN STREAM) tool (https://raven-stream.shinyapps.io/raven_stream/).
(1) What industrial chemical products are used, what are their chemical compositions, and in what quantities are these products stored on-site at upstream facilities at any given time?
(2) How toxic are these industrial chemical products and/or their constituent chemical ingredients to the microorganisms in the receiving STP?
(3) How much of the industrial chemical product, if spilled, will reach the biological treatment regions of the STP?
Here, we use the Käppala sewage treatment plant, located on the island of Lidingö in the Stockholm Archipelago, as a case study. Käppala is owned and operated by a partnership of 11 suburban governments in the greater metropolitan area of Stockholm, Sweden (see Fig. S1 in the ESI†). It treats wastewater from ∼567000 person-equivalents, and a wide variety of industrial facilities (2200 registered) are connected to the waste stream, including energy plants, hospitals, chemical industries, food processing facilities, and car washes (see Table 1).
Facility category | Total # products | # products only MR reported | # products only YR reported | # products MR & YR reported | Total # constituent chemicals | # chemicals with valid STP PNEC values | # chemicals with no toxicity likely/expected | # chemicals with STP PNEC information missing |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
a Of the 3203 constituent chemical uses that do not have STP PNEC information, 1293 (15% of total) have CAS numbers that match chemicals in the ECHA database, 1613 (19% of total) have valid CAS numbers but do not have matching chemicals in the ECHA STP PNEC database, and 297 (3% of total) have invalid CAS numbers reported from the upstream industries. Abbreviations: MR: maximum mass of chemical product in stock directly reported by facilities. YR: reported yearly usage of chemical product (see Section 2.1.2). STP PNEC: sewage treatment plant predicted no-effect concentration. | ||||||||
Airport | 45 | 0 | 45 | 0 | 108 | 42 | 19 | 47 |
Buses 01 | 144 | 0 | 61 | 83 | 507 | 238 | 74 | 195 |
Automotive 01 | 22 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 72 | 21 | 6 | 45 |
Automotive 02 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 16 | 3 | 2 | 11 |
Automotive 03 | 118 | 0 | 118 | 0 | 441 | 140 | 73 | 228 |
Buses 02 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 192 | 132 | 22 | 38 |
Waste disposal | 46 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 194 | 87 | 27 | 80 |
Chemical industries 01 | 160 | 4 | 125 | 31 | 261 | 103 | 52 | 106 |
Automotive 04 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 18 | 8 | 4 | 6 |
Disposal plants | 167 | 0 | 145 | 22 | 576 | 246 | 75 | 255 |
Energy plants | 164 | 52 | 30 | 82 | 476 | 185 | 48 | 243 |
Food industry | 57 | 0 | 24 | 33 | 139 | 57 | 23 | 59 |
Hospitals | 33 | 0 | 33 | 0 | 41 | 27 | 2 | 12 |
Buses 03 | 102 | 9 | 1 | 92 | 357 | 153 | 34 | 170 |
Laundry | 116 | 7 | 38 | 71 | 345 | 163 | 60 | 122 |
Automotive 05 | 69 | 0 | 60 | 9 | 359 | 167 | 83 | 109 |
Chemical industries 02 | 493 | 0 | 493 | 0 | 3600 | 2342 | 136 | 1122 |
Surface treatment | 13 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 50 | 30 | 6 | 14 |
Train washes | 97 | 0 | 61 | 36 | 335 | 150 | 45 | 140 |
Vehicles other | 195 | 1 | 145 | 49 | 589 | 299 | 89 | 201 |
All industries | 2086 | 73 | 1417 | 596 | 8676 | 4593 | 880 | 3203a |
Käppala employs a mix of mechanical, chemical, and biological treatment steps to treat influent wastewater (see Fig. S2†). The first step in the treatment process screens out large material and employs a grit settling chamber. Influent is then split into 11 separate treatment lines. The initial phase of these treatment lines is the primary sedimentation stage, with a residence time of 4–6 hours, where approximately 66% of the suspended solids in the wastewater influent are removed and diverted to an anaerobic digestor. After primary sedimentation, wastewater is treated in activated sludge tanks. Here, the wastewater is passed through anoxic, aerated, and non-aerated parts of the tank over a period of roughly 24 hours. The wastewater is then passed to secondary sedimentation tanks, where return activated sludge is recycled back into the activated sludge region at half of the inflow rate as well as diverted to the STP's anaerobic digestor (whose median residence time is roughly 20 days). On all of the treatment lines, ferrous sulphate is added to the return activated sludge from the secondary sedimentation to remove phosphorus. Finally, the remaining wastewater is passed through a sand filtration step, and the effluent is released at a rate of approximately 140000 m3 day−1 into the Baltic Sea at a depth of 45 meters, having removed roughly 80% of the total nitrogen, 97% of the phosphorus, and 99% of the organic matter (expressed as biological oxygen demand BOD) from the influent wastewater.2,11 Sludge processed in the anaerobic digestor is used on agricultural fields, and biogas generated by the plant is processed for use in city buses.11
Our approach to answering each of the three sub-questions for the Käppala sewage treatment plant, and synthesizing the answers into the RAVEN-STREAM threat identification framework that can be applied to other STPs, is described in the following sections. All analysis was conducted using the R programming language, version 3.6.0 (ref. 12).
In cases where a range of fraction contributions to the overall product is provided for a constituent chemical, the higher-end of this range was selected and used in our analysis to maintain a conservative estimate of chemical risk (the sensitivity of the results to this assumption is explored in Section 3.5.1). For product usage and/or storage amounts that were provided on a volume basis, a density of 1 kg L−1 was assumed to convert volume to mass.
Max-in-stock values (MR, kg, where the subscript R denotes reported values) were directly reported for 669 (32%) of the upstream chemical products, while for 2013 products (∼97%) yearly usage data (YR, kg year−1) were reported. For 596 products (∼29%), both YR and MR values were reported. To estimate max-in-stock values for chemical products for which only YR was reported, we developed an extrapolation algorithm based on the relationship between max-in-stock values and yearly usage values for the 596 chemical products for which both were reported. For products where both YR and MR values were reported, the maximum number of months of inventory of a product in stock (tmax, months) was calculated using eqn (1):
(1) |
The distribution of tmax across the 596 chemical products is shown in Fig. S3.† For chemical products where only yearly usage values are provided, an estimated (denoted by subscript E) max-in-stock value, ME, is then derived using eqn (2):
(2) |
We developed a web scraping algorithm to extract STP PNEC values from across CAS number-specific Brief Profile webpages provided by ECHA. To do this, we downloaded the full list of registered chemicals within the ECHA database, which contains a mapping between the CAS number and the chemical's Infocard number.16 This Infocard number is the primary identifier within the CAS number-specific URL for the Brief Profile webpage where the chemical's property and toxicity data can be accessed. A total of 18280 CAS number-URL matches were established. Using the R programming language packages ‘rvest’17 and ‘xml2’,18 along with information on the structure of the HTML code for the Brief Profile webpages, the available STP PNEC information was scraped from the Brief Profile of each chemical. Because we collected STP PNEC values directly from the ECHA Brief Profiles and not the underlying dossiers, we did not collect information on the type of test used to derive each STP PNEC value, or the assessment factors applied in deriving the final displayed STP PNEC value. The STP PNEC values are used ‘as-is’ from the data provided on the ECHA webpage, and any possible errors made in the transfer of toxicity information in the chemical dossiers to the values provided on the ECHA webpage are not considered.
Using the above web scraping procedure, STP PNEC values for 4496 unique CAS numbers were extracted, along with 1672 chemicals being identified as having either no or no expected toxicity towards STP microorganisms. 217 of the 4496 STP PNEC values that were identified in the ECHA database have a range of values provided. In our default assessment scenario, the lowest available STP PNEC value (i.e., highest toxicity) for a given chemical was employed to maintain a conservative estimate of risk. The impact on the results of using the full range of STP PNEC toxicity values when deriving chemical risks is explored in Section 3.5.1.
Fig. 1 Schematic illustrating assumptions for the high-end contamination scenarios assessed for potential down-the-drain spills of industrial chemical products and their constituent chemicals that are used upstream of the Käppala sewage treatment plant. While there are 3 anaerobic digestors on site at Käppala, at the time of the analysis only 2 were operational, and so the volume of these two is used in the chemical risk calculations. The different regions of the plant are not drawn to scale. See Fig. S2† for a schematic of the full-scale treatment process at Käppala. |
We calculated the masses of the constituent chemicals from their reported fraction contribution in the bulk chemical products, and we used these chemical masses along with corresponding STP PNEC values as the basis of the risk calculation. The risk Ri for a given constituent chemical (i) posed to a specific region of the plant (i.e., the smaller activated sludge region, the larger activated sludge region, or the anaerobic digestors region) is calculated using eqn (3):
(3) |
(4) |
The anaerobic digestor is the region of the plant where the lowest chemical dilution potential exists, i.e., the region where the combination of the fraction of diverted influent and the volume of the region results in the highest concentration of chemical (see Fig. 1). However, the focus of the STP PNEC values is on quantifying the impact of chemicals on nutrient removal (particularly using the respiration inhibition test), rather than on processes occurring in an anaerobic digestor (e.g., biogas production), so it is unclear how the toxicities provided by ECHA relate to toxicity towards anaerobic digestor microorganisms.14,15 In the absence of toxicity values directly applicable to anaerobic systems, we present risks for the second-most exposed region of the plant, i.e., the smaller activated sludge region, in Fig. 3 and 5. Risk quotients for the larger activated sludge region are a constant factor of 1.1 lower than the risk quotients for the smaller activated sludge region, reflecting differences in dilution of chemicals (see Table S2†). If STP PNECs are assumed to also apply to the anaerobic digestor, then risk quotients are highest there, a constant factor of 7.5 higher than in the smaller activated sludge region.
Fig. 2 Results of the uranine tracer chemical spill dilution experiments showing the breakthrough curves of the three spill experiments as measured at the inlet to Käppala (normalized to an injected mass of 1 kg uranine). For each experiment, the distance between the injection point and Käppala is noted, along with the duration of the breakthrough curve, measured as the amount of time that at least 5% of the maximum tracer concentration was measured in the influent sewage stream. See ESI† for more details. Figure generated using the R programming language package ‘ggplot2’.30 |
Fig. 3 Scatterplots of the constituent chemical (n = 4593, panel A) and bulk industrial chemical product (n = 2086, panel B) exposure concentrations and associated risks posed to the smaller activated sludge region of Käppala using the high-end spill scenario. Pink-coloured squares correspond to values for which the maximum mass of industrial chemical product held in stock at a given time was extrapolated based on the annual usage of that product using a value of tmax(P = 50) (using eqn (1) and (2); see Section 2.1.2). Green circles correspond to values for which the max-in-stock value was directly reported by the facility. In panel A, risk values are shown for all constituent chemicals present in the upstream industrial chemical usage survey for which sewage treatment plant predicted no effect concentration (STP PNEC) values were available from the European Chemicals Agency. In panel B, risk values are shown for the industrial chemical products corresponding to the constituent chemicals in panel A, assuming additive toxicity of the risks from the constituent chemicals (calculated using eqn (4)). See Fig. 1 for an explanation of the regions of the sewage treatment plant. Figures generated using the R programming language package ‘ggplot2’.30 |
Using the risk values presented in Fig. 3, an upstream chemical risk prioritization list was developed for all constituent chemicals that exhibit a risk value >1 for the activated sludge regions of the plant (Table S2†). This ranking identifies the constituent chemicals (and their parent products) that should be prioritized by the upstream chemical managers at Käppala. For example, the two highest risk constituent chemicals, namely 1305-78-8 (calcium oxide) and 1305-62-0 (calcium dihydroxide) exhibit risk values over 100 to the smaller activated sludge region. Additional investigation is needed regarding the actual masses of the parent industrial chemical product that is in stock at the upstream facilities, the feasibility of a down-the-drain spill occurring, and other factors to determine if additional spill mitigation measures are needed. Table S2† provides risk values for all three regions of the plant.
Fig. 3, panel B shows the potential risk that industrial chemical products used upstream pose to the smaller activated sludge region of Käppala assuming additive toxicity of the constituent chemicals in a given product. While a slight upward shift in risks is seen compared to the risks from constituent chemicals in panel A, most products still pose a risk value less than 1, indicating an adverse outcome in the smaller activated sludge region is unlikely from exposure to these industrial chemical products under the high-end spill scenario. As in Table S2, Table S3† displays the risk prioritization list for all upstream industrial chemical products that pose an additive risk of >1 to the activated sludge regions. For almost all of the industrial products, the ranking of risk does not change from the ranking based on the single constituent chemical risks in Table S2.† The minimal shifting of industrial chemical product prioritization relative to the constituent chemical prioritization indicates that for these high-risk industrial products, the risk is generally being driven by a single constituent chemical.
Fig. 4 Part of the graphical user interface of the Rapid Assessment of Vulnerability from Emissions Upstream (RAVEN STREAM) online tool. User input file paths and sewage treatment plant operating properties are input on the left-hand side, while a partial display of the input data is shown on the right. Chemical risk and uncertainty visualizations and prioritization lists are generated as output upon running the tool. The tool can be found at the following web address: https://raven-stream.shinyapps.io/raven_stream/. Raven icon from Freepik viahttp://Flaticon.com. Graphical user interface generated using the R programming language package ‘shiny’.20 |
For industrial chemical product risks, the additive risk estimates may only reflect the risk from a subset of the full number of constituent chemicals in the bulk product, since risk values can only be calculated for constituent chemicals for which corresponding STP PNEC values are available from ECHA. As an illustration of this uncertainty, Fig. 5 panel B displays potential risks to the smaller activated sludge region from industrial chemical products with the shading of the data points corresponding to the fraction of the constituent chemicals in the product for which STP PNEC values were available. This analysis indicates that of the 1350 products for which any risk values were able to be calculated from their constituent chemicals, 715 products have STP PNEC values for 75 to 100% of their constituent chemicals, while 635 of the products have STP PNEC values for fewer than 75% of their constituent chemicals. Furthermore, 52 products exhibit additive risk values between 0.1 and 1 where STP PNEC values for less than 100% of their constituent chemicals are available. It is possible that the risk value of 1 could be exceeded for these products if toxicity information were available for all of the constituent chemicals. Upstream chemical managers at the STP should take such uncertainty surrounding the toxicity of chemical products into consideration when allocating resources for additional investigation with upstream industrial facilities, particularly for products that have moderate risk values (e.g., 0.1–1) but a low availability of the constituent chemical STP PNECs.
Fig. 5 Panel A: scatterplot of the constituent chemical exposure concentrations and associated potential risks posed to the smaller activated sludge region of Käppala using the high-end industrial chemical product spill scenario. Uncertainty associated with the exposure and risk values is illustrated using error bars and accounts for the possible range of STP PNEC values, the range of fraction contribution of constituent chemicals within the industrial product, and values of tmax(P = 25) to tmax(P = 75) for estimating max-in-stock chemical product masses from yearly usage data (using eqn (1) and (2); Section 2.1.2). For ease of viewing, points are only plotted if their uncertainty risk range exceeds the threshold of 1. Pink-coloured squares and lines correspond to chemicals for which the max-in-stock amount of the parent industrial chemical product was estimated (see Section 2.1.2), while green circles correspond to products for which the max-in-stock amount of the product was directly reported by the facility. Panel B: scatterplot of the chemical product exposure concentrations and associated potential risks posed to the smaller activated sludge region of Käppala using the high-end spill scenarios and assuming additivity of the exposures and risks from constituent chemicals in the products. Shading corresponds to the percent of the constituent chemicals in a product for which STP PNEC values were available. Squares correspond to products for which the max-in-stock amount of the industrial chemical product was estimated based on the annual usage of that product using a value of tmax(P = 50), while circles correspond to products for which the max-in-stock amount was directly reported by the facility. In both panels, the y-axis is focused to risk values above 0.1 to enable easier interpretation of the figure. Figures generated using the R programming language package ‘ggplot2’.30 |
While the in situ measurements of simulated chemical spills outlined in Section 2.3.1 indicate that the assumption that spilled chemical reaches the biological treatment process as a single dose is valid, these measurements were limited to spills along a few locations on or near the primary sewer tunnels, rather than within the individual municipal sewer networks (see Fig. S1 and S4†). Municipal sewer networks are more likely to increase the dilution and spreading of down-the-drain spills due to increased tortuosity, non-uniformity, and number of connections in such networks compared to the primary sewer tunnels. Such non-uniform reaches of the sewer network may have dispersion coefficients substantially larger (potentially by a factor of 100) than reaches with uniform geometry and stable flow.22 Furthermore, some in-stream losses of the chemical tracer were observed in the chemical spill simulations (between ∼26% and ∼33%, see Table S1†), however we did not consider this process in our risk screening. Additionally, neither degradation nor the formation of transformation products of the spilled chemicals were considered in the risk screening.
As indicated in Section 3.1, STP PNEC information was only available for 63% of the constituent chemicals present in the upstream industrial product use survey. For the remaining 37% of constituent chemicals, no risk values could be calculated, highlighting a key limitation of this study. Furthermore, the STP PNEC values obtained from the ECHA database of chemical properties are used as-is, and any uncertainties or errors associated with their reported values are not considered (other than when a range of values is reported by ECHA; see Section 3.5.1). Additionally, the assumption of additive toxicity of the constituent chemicals when estimating the risk of the full chemical products ignores possible synergistic or antagonistic effects of chemical mixtures. This is, however, an assumption commonly used in toxicology and is generally a good assumption for chemical risk screening.23
Furthermore, prolonged exposure to some chemicals can modify microorganism communities within activated sludge.24,25 Käppala may have had previous exposures to industrial products that have been used upstream for some time due to regular use and disposal patterns of these products, but in small enough quantities that have not resulted in a toxic shock. The impact of such previous exposures on the actual toxicity of a spilled product to the specific microorganism community at Käppala is, however, beyond the scope of this study. Similarly, microorganism communities can adapt such that previously harmful concentrations of chemicals are no longer damaging to the nutrient removal capabilities of the plant,26 and this potential for the microorganism community to be adapted to contamination of a previously-spilled industrial chemical is not captured in this screening framework. It is also possible that background levels of industrial chemicals present in the influent wastewater could exacerbate the effects of a chemical spill on the treatment plants' microorganisms, however our analysis and online tool do not consider these possible background effects when generating the upstream chemical prioritization list.
Additionally, only potential chemical spills from permanent, known locations of stored chemicals can be analysed within the RAVEN STREAM framework. Sewage treatment plants can be threatened by spills from releases of chemicals down the drain from other entities, such as from spills during the transport of chemicals9 or from dumping of chemicals used in illicit drug manufacturing.27 Such potential upstream chemical risks are not assessed in the current version of RAVEN STREAM.
While STPs are limited by the data they are able to collect on the mass and constituents of chemical products used at upstream facilities, the RAVEN STREAM online tool offers the opportunity to rapidly prioritize which facilities and chemical products should be investigated for additional information related to specific storage patterns, existing infrastructure that may attenuate the mass of a spilled chemical that reaches the main sewer lines (e.g., on-site sewage treatment at the industry), or other information that could further refine possible spill and contamination scenarios of high-risk chemical products. This risk screening and additional information gathering would inform spill mitigation measures that may be needed at a given facility to reduce the risk of adverse outcomes at the receiving STP.
Footnotes |
† Electronic supplementary information (ESI) available. See DOI: https://doi.org/10.1039/d3va00067b |
‡ Now at Technology and Society Laboratory, Empa – Swiss Federal Laboratories for Materials Science and Technology, Lerchenfeldstrasse 5, CH-9014 St. Gallen, Switzerland. |
§ Now at Naturvårdsverket, Virkesvägen 2, 12030 Stockholm, Sweden. |
¶ Now at Sweco Sverige AB, Gjörwellsgatan 22, 112 60 Stockholm, Sweden. |
This journal is © The Royal Society of Chemistry 2023 |